QUESTION 7.5.1

Cyber-risk controls for shipboard IT and OT systems

Oil, Chemical, LPG, LNGDocumentation, Bridge, Cargo Control Room, Engine Control Room

What is being checked

The inspector is checking whether cyber risk is embedded in the safety-management system and implemented onboard. Procedures, asset awareness, access control, removable media, remote access, updates, backups, incident response, recovery arrangements and crew behaviour should protect both information technology and operational technology.

Ready onboard

0/9 complete

PROCEDURECompany cyber-risk procedures define onboard and shore responsibilities and cover identification, protection, detection, response and recovery.INVENTORYA current inventory identifies sensitive shipboard IT and OT systems, responsible persons and relevant dependencies.ACCESSPhysical and logical access, administrator privileges, user accounts, passwords and remote connections are controlled and reviewed.MEDIARemovable media and contractor devices are authorised and checked through the approved malware-control process before connection.UPDATESAnti-malware protection, software updates and security patches are managed under company and equipment-maker controls.BACKUPSCritical configurations and data are backed up, protected and periodically verified for recovery.CONTINGENCYNon-electronic contingency information is available for loss or corruption of navigation, propulsion, cargo, communications and other critical systems.TRAININGCrew members understand phishing, credential protection, removable media, reporting and their system-access limitations.SUPPORTCurrent shore or contractor technical-support contacts and the cyber-incident escalation route are available.

Practice questions

Answer aloud, then open the preparation point.

1Which shipboard IT and OT systems are treated as critical, and where is the controlled inventory maintained?

Use the controlled asset inventory to identify critical systems, their operational purpose, responsible person, dependencies and approved support route.

2How are administrator rights, user accounts and passwords managed during crew changes?

Administrator rights should be limited and authorised; individual accounts should be reviewed, changed or removed at crew change under the company procedure.

3What approval is required before a technician connects locally or remotely to a critical system?

Obtain formal company approval, identify the technician and scope, control the connection, monitor the work and retain permitted evidence of access and completion.

4How is removable media checked before use on bridge, cargo or machinery systems?

Use only approved media and the designated malware-checking process on a suitable isolated system before connection to shipboard IT or OT equipment.

5Which critical data and configurations are backed up, and how is recovery verified?

Identify the protected backup for each critical system and show permitted evidence that restoration or recovery has been tested at the required interval.

6What would the ship do if ECDIS, GNSS input, propulsion control or shore connectivity were lost through a cyber incident?

Apply the relevant hard-copy contingency plan, maintain safe manual or alternative operation, isolate affected systems where authorised and contact shore support.

7How would you report and escalate a suspected cyber incident?

Preserve safety, report through the company cyber-incident route, contact technical support, record the event and avoid unauthorised actions that could destroy evidence or spread the incident.

Where an observation may arise

PROCEDURE

Cyber-risk responsibilities or controls are absent from the SMS or not implemented onboard.

INVENTORY

Sensitive IT and OT systems are not identified in a current controlled inventory.

ACCESS

Administrator rights, generic accounts, passwords, exposed ports or remote access are inadequately controlled.

MEDIA

Portable media or contractor equipment is connected without approval and malware checking.

UPDATES

Anti-malware, software or security updates are unmanaged, overdue or unsupported by records.

BACKUPS

Critical backups are absent, unprotected or have not been verified for recovery.

CONTINGENCY

Hard-copy contingency plans or recovery actions for critical-system loss are unavailable.

TRAINING

Crew members cannot explain basic cyber hygiene, reporting or their access responsibilities.

SUPPORT

The cyber-incident escalation route and technical-support contacts are unavailable.

Past observations for practice

Process

The USB on the computer in the CCR was left unlocked.

Master's practical note

Select one critical system on the bridge, in the cargo control room or in the engine control room. Trace its owner, access rights, remote-support approval, removable-media control, update route, backup and recovery plan. Cyber preparation becomes credible when the officer can explain one complete operational chain.

Equipment boundary and references

Equipment boundary: Do not publish network diagrams, IP addresses, credentials, exposed ports, remote-access methods or system vulnerabilities. Cyber controls vary with equipment age, maker support and network architecture. The latest company procedure, maker restrictions and approved shore support govern the fitted systems.

References

OCIMF SIRE 2.0 Question Library Part 1, Version 1.0, Question 7.5.1
IMO Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management, latest revision
IMO Resolution MSC.428(98), Maritime Cyber Risk Management in Safety Management Systems
Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships, current industry edition
Company cyber-risk management procedures

Last reviewed: 2026-08-25