QUESTION 7.1.1

Security risk assessment integrated into voyage planning

Oil, Chemical, LPG, LNGBridge

What is being checked

The inspector is checking whether security is treated as part of voyage planning for the actual voyage, not as a separate generic form. The threat assessment, route, passage-plan controls, current intelligence, reporting arrangements and bridge-team understanding should form one traceable chain for each relevant leg.

Ready onboard

0/8 complete

GUIDANCECurrent BMP Maritime Security, company guidance, applicable security charts and regional advisories are available.ASSESSMENTA ship-specific and voyage-specific threat and risk assessment addresses the present route, threat picture, vessel characteristics and operation.PASSAGE PLANSecurity controls, reporting requirements and actions for relevant voyage legs are incorporated into the approved passage plan without exposing confidential details.INTELLIGENCEThe Master can show how current threat information was obtained, assessed and updated before and during the voyage.REPORTINGApplicable voluntary or mandatory reporting arrangements, contact routes and reporting boundaries have been identified.CONTROLSWatchkeeping, access control, hardening readiness, communications and contingency measures reflect the assessed risk.REVIEWThe assessment is reviewed when the route, intelligence, security level, port call or operational circumstances change.KNOWLEDGEBridge officers understand the security controls relevant to their watch and can explain where they appear in the voyage plan.

Practice questions

Answer aloud, then open the preparation point.

1Show how the security threat assessment influenced the passage plan for this voyage.

Trace one relevant voyage leg from the current threat information to the assessed risk, selected control, passage-plan entry and bridge-team briefing.

2Which current intelligence sources were used, and how do you confirm that they remain current?

Identify the controlled company and industry sources used, then verify their issue date, update status and relevance to the actual route.

3What would trigger a review of the security risk assessment during the voyage?

Review is required after a material change in threat intelligence, route, port call, security level, vessel condition or planned operation.

4Which reporting arrangements apply to the planned route, and when are reports required?

Use the reporting scheme applicable to the trading area. Show the required report types, timing, contact route and acknowledgement without publishing sensitive voyage details.

5How are the bridge watch, access control and vessel-hardening measures linked to the assessed threat?

The assessed threat should drive watch level, access control, communications, reporting, hardening readiness and contingency measures for the relevant leg.

6What would you do if the threat picture changed after the passage plan had been approved?

Reassess the threat, consult the CSO as required, amend the passage plan and controls, brief the bridge team and complete any revised reporting.

Where an observation may arise

ASSESSMENT

The assessment is generic, copied from an earlier voyage or does not reflect the vessel and current route.

PASSAGE PLAN

Security information and controls are absent from the relevant legs of the passage plan.

INTELLIGENCE

Current security guidance, charts, advisories or regional information are unavailable or outdated.

REPORTING

Applicable regional reporting arrangements have not been identified or completed.

REVIEW

The assessment was not reconsidered after a material change in route, threat or operating circumstances.

KNOWLEDGE

The Master or bridge officers cannot explain the security measures applicable to the current voyage.

Master's practical note

Select one security-sensitive leg and trace it from the latest intelligence through the risk assessment to the passage plan, reporting requirement and bridge standing orders. The test is whether the controls are genuinely voyage-specific and understood, not whether a security file is thick.

Equipment boundary and references

Equipment boundary: Do not publish route-specific security measures, confidential risk-assessment details, citadel arrangements, response thresholds or other information protected by the Ship Security Plan. The public guide should explain the evidence chain without revealing the control itself.

References

OCIMF SIRE 2.0 Question Library Part 1, Version 1.0, Question 7.1.1
BMP Maritime Security, current edition
SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code
Company security procedures and approved Ship Security Plan

Last reviewed: 2026-08-25