India’s EEZ Tanker Detention: AIS and Legal Exposure

Forensic Enforcement and the Master’s Professional Loneliness

In early February 2026, the Indian Coast Guard conducted a coordinated sea-and-air operation approximately 100 nautical miles west of Mumbai, detaining three tankers: Stellar Ruby, Asphalt Star, and Al Jafzia.

The First Information Report registered at Mumbai’s Yellow Gate Police Station on 15 February 2026 alleges AIS spoofing, concealment of vessel identity, unauthorized petroleum distribution, suspicious cross-border movement, and failure to produce statutory documentation. The offences invoked are cognizable and non-bailable.

The owner has publicly stated that bunkers and water were supplied to a vessel facing operational constraints offshore and that no unlawful trade was involved. The matter is now before the courts.

This article does not address guilt or innocence. It examines instead what the case reveals structurally: enforcement inside the EEZ has shifted from reactive boarding to digital reconstruction, and the Master now stands at the convergence of commercial instruction and criminal liability.


I. Jurisdictional Creep: When Navigation Becomes “Activity”

Traditionally, the EEZ (12–200 nautical miles) was viewed through UNCLOS Article 58 as an area of navigational freedom, subject to limited coastal-state intervention.

It is also worth stating that the United States is not a party to UNCLOS. Its tanker interdictions on the high seas are therefore grounded in domestic sanctions and national security authority rather than in obligations assumed under the Convention. While Washington maintains that key navigational provisions of UNCLOS reflect customary international law, its enforcement posture does not arise from treaty ratification.

Such enforcement measures have drawn sharp criticism from other states, including Russia, which has publicly characterized certain high-seas interdictions as unlawful or tantamount to piracy. Those descriptions reflect geopolitical dispute rather than settled legal determination.

India stands in a different position. It is a party to UNCLOS, and its Maritime Zones Act of 1976 is built within that treaty framework. While Article 58 preserves freedom of navigation within the EEZ, Article 73 permits coastal states to enforce laws relating to their sovereign rights. When India asserts enforcement authority inside its EEZ, the debate is not about unilateral projection of power, but about how expansively a coastal state may interpret those rights.

The 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone creates a legal boundary where navigation freedoms intersect with coastal-state economic jurisdiction.

While UNCLOS Article 73 is most commonly associated with fisheries enforcement, petroleum-related interdictions in practice rely more heavily on domestic legislation. In India’s case, enforcement authority in “Customs Waters” under the Customs Act, 1962, read alongside the Maritime Zones Act, extends regulatory reach beyond the territorial sea. This creates a friction point: does the EEZ’s resource-protection mandate permit preventive action against alleged duty evasion before cargo physically enters port?

The transfer of petroleum products between vessels within an EEZ is a commercial activity. As such, it attracts the regulatory and fiscal jurisdiction of the coastal state under its applicable domestic law.

The EEZ cannot be treated as a fiscal vacuum. When commercial activity takes place within it, coastal-state oversight follows. For shipowners, exposure is determined by activity, not by distance from shore.


II. AIS as Forensic Testimony

AIS, mandated under SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19, was designed as a traffic transparency mechanism. Today, it has become a primary evidentiary tool in maritime enforcement.

In this case, the allegation is of “spoofing” or manipulation of AIS in a manner said to have concealed or altered the vessel’s true identity and movement. An unexplained technical outage raises compliance questions; deliberate alteration of transmitted identity, MMSI data, navigational status, or positional information, if established, raises questions of intent.

AIS transmission history compared against radar and satellite imagery during investigation.

AIS data is no longer evaluated alone. It is correlated with LRIT records, ECDIS tracks, Voyage Data Recorder timelines, port histories, and satellite-based surveillance including satellite-based surveillance tools, including synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery capable of detecting vessel proximity even in the absence of AIS transmission. Bridge audio and logbooks are examined alongside transmission history to reconstruct vessel movement with precision.

If the AIS record conflicts with the ship’s logs, the vessel must explain the gap. Unresolved discrepancies are treated as concealment, and the Master stands at the center of that inquiry.

Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) imagery detects vessel presence at sea independently of AIS transmission.

III. The Master’s Dilemma: Commercial Orders vs. Personal Liability

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of modern offshore enforcement is the accountability imbalance.

A mid-sea transfer 100 miles offshore does not originate on the bridge. It is the result of a chain of emails from chartering managers, owners, and bunker traders, and these people are rarely on board when the Coast Guard boarding team arrives.

The Master receives a bunker stem and operational instructions. He is rarely provided with a jurisdictional opinion or sanctions risk assessment. Yet once hoses are connected, statutory documentation begins.

In a prosecution scenario, that certified entry can operate as documentary admission if the underlying activity is later classified as unlawful. The Master is the only individual in the operational chain legally required to authenticate the movement of oil onboard. That asymmetry is structural. That authentication converts operational compliance into personal certification.

The reality is stark:

  • Refusal risks friction with the employers.
  • Compliance risks personal exposure if the activity is later deemed unlawful.

The ISM Code grants the Master overriding authority for safety and pollution prevention. It provides no equivalent protection when commercial legality becomes the issue.

I was following instructions” is not a guaranteed defense in document-based prosecutions. Enforcement action leaves the Master on board facing inquiry, while the commercial decision-makers remain ashore.

Bridge watch during offshore operations. Command responsibility remains onboard even when commercial decisions originate ashore.

IV. The Charge Sheet and the Master’s Exposure

The Master has been named under multiple statutes spanning criminal law, information technology law, customs regulation, petroleum control, and merchant shipping compliance.

Whatever the judicial outcome, the breadth of sections invoked illustrates the scale of exposure that can arise from a single offshore transfer executed under commercial instruction.

The cited provisions include:


·  Criminal endangerment provisions

·  Digital identity manipulation provisions

·  Customs confiscation provisions

·  Petroleum licensing controls

·  Merchant Shipping statutory duties

·  Essential Commodities fuel regulation

In operational terms, a transfer interpreted as unauthorized trade combined with alleged digital manipulation can expose a Master simultaneously to criminal, fiscal, electronic, and maritime liability.

Extract from the First Information Report (FIR) referencing statutory provisions invoked in the investigation.

V. The High Bar of “Distress”

Supplying a vessel in distress invokes SOLAS Chapter V, Regulation 33, a well-established duty of customary international law codified also in UNCLOS Article 98. Distress requires grave and imminent danger. Regulators and courts look for documented markers: a Mayday or Pan-Pan broadcast, MRCC notification, a recorded propulsion or safety failure. Operational inconvenience does not meet that threshold. A vessel that wants bunkers rather than needs them urgently for survival is not, without considerably more, a vessel in distress in the legal sense.

Without formal distress markers in the record, a supply characterized as humanitarian assistance is liable to be reclassified as regulated trade. That reclassification changes the applicable regulatory framework, the documentation that should have been in place, and the fiscal obligations that attach to the transaction.

Mayday transmission and MRCC notification form the legal foundation of a distress claim under SOLAS.

VI. Proportionality and the “Dark Fleet” Effect

Petroleum transfers today operate within a wider geopolitical environment where sanctions regimes, energy trade routes, and strategic autonomy intersect at sea. That context cannot be ignored.

In this case, however, the enforcement action rests on domestic statutory provisions invoked in the FIR. There is no publicly established evidence in the arrest documentation linking the detention to tariff negotiations or alignment with another state’s sanctions regime.

Coastal-state action ultimately stands or falls on the legal authority cited in its own statutes, not on speculative narratives of geopolitical alignment.

The vessels exhibiting AIS irregularities, opaque ownership, or unconventional transfer patterns operate in an environment where suspicion thresholds are lower. Inspection can follow suspicion, but detention requires a clear legal basis.

Inspection thresholds have tightened as offshore petroleum transfers face heightened regulatory scrutiny.

VII. Master Protection Framework

If offshore transfers within 200 nautical miles are enforcement-sensitive, structural correction is required.

Offshore transfers are commercial decisions initiated ashore. The Master does not determine cargo origin, sanction exposure, or fiscal positioning within an EEZ. He executes instruction within the statutory chain of command.

Yet documentation is executed onboard. The Oil Record Book entry is made under his authority. The Bunker Delivery Note becomes part of the legal record. When enforcement follows, those signatures become focal points.

If such operations are to continue, they must be accompanied by:

  • Written jurisdictional clearance prior to transfer
  • Documented confirmation of licensing and fiscal compliance
  • Controlled AIS governance protocols
  • Immediate legal response mechanisms upon detention

The Master does not share in commercial upside. He carries command responsibility. Accountability must reflect that distribution of authority.

Structural protection of the Master does not absolve documentary responsibility. If falsified records are knowingly signed or discrepancies deliberately ignored, culpability follows. Protection must therefore operate within the boundary of good-faith command conduct.

In a digitally monitored EEZ, operational defensibility is not achieved by seamanship alone. It requires compliance architecture aligned with where commercial decisions are made.

Command responsibility includes documentary certification, making structural legal safeguards essential.

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