SIRE 2.0: Digital Ambition Crashing into Analog Ineptitude

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Why OCIMF Inspectors Must Meet the Same Standards as Seafarers or Risk Total Irrelevance

OCIMF launched SIRE 2.0 with great fanfare, promising cutting-edge digital tools, risk modeling, and unprecedented data insights. Instead, it has exposed a harsh truth, inspectors with tablets are enforcing standards they barely understand.

On a recent inspection of a Japanese tanker, the inspector’s “findings” were not only outdated but they were outright wrong. His confusion over basic concepts like the Master’s command during pilotage and how ECDIS layers function was painfully obvious. The problem was not the ship or crew but the inspection itself.

One inspector even claimed “the conn was not handed over to the pilot.” This betrays a fundamental ignorance of international rules. IMO Resolution A.960, Annex 2, clearly states: “The master, and not the pilot, is at all times in command of the ship. The pilot is an adviser.” Likewise, STCW Code Section A-VIII/2 (Part 3–1, para 34) requires that the officer of the watch must “retain responsibility for the safe navigation of the ship” even when a pilot is on board.

There is no formal “handover of the conn” , the Master retains command, the pilot provides advice, and officers continue their duties. In practice, it is as simple as recording: “MPX completed and pilotage duties commenced.”

The same ignorance showed in ECDIS use. Inspectors complained chart layers weren’t switched between coastal and open sea, ignoring that ECDIS adjusts automatically by scale and settings. The base layer is fixed; optional layers are at the officer’s discretion and company policy. Misunderstanding this leads to unfair observations that erode crew confidence and undermine inspection integrity.

Worse still, many inspectors simply parrot OCIMF guidance they don’t understand, reading verbatim with no context or flexibility. When challenged, they respond with rigidity and poor communication, a demeanor far below the professional standard expected at sea.

This is a direct violation of SOLAS Chapter V, Regulation 14, which explicitly requires that “officers and ratings forming part of a navigational watch shall be able to communicate effectively in the English language” for the exchange of essential information regarding ship safety. The ISM Code likewise emphasizes effective communication and mutual understanding as the foundation of safe operations. Yet, SIRE 2.0’s promise of collaborative evaluation is meaningless if inspectors themselves cannot communicate clearly or even phrase basic English. At the very least, inspectors should be subject to a formal grammar and English proficiency test the same standard already imposed on the seafarers they are evaluating.

The root of the problem lies with OCIMF. Their guidance notes contain ambiguities and technically questionable expectations like demanding a conn handover that contradicts global pilotage practice or insisting on ECDIS layer changes unsupported by equipment standards. OCIMF must urgently audit and overhaul these documents. Without fixing guidance, inspector errors will persist.

Moreover, OCIMF’s failure to rigorously assess inspector competency is inexcusable. While seafarers face continuous training, revalidations, and assessments, inspectors , some who have not sailed for decades, operate without any formal knowledge verification, feedback, or accountability. This hypocrisy undermines the entire SIRE regime’s credibility.

OCIMF must enforce formal inspector evaluations after every inspection. Continuing professional development should be mandatory, covering regulatory updates, ECDIS operation, and essential communication skills. English proficiency testing must be strictly enforced on vessels where English is the operational language.

If seafarers are held to high standards of competence and communication, inspectors must be no exception. The credibility of SIRE 2.0 depends on inspectors who truly understand current regulations, master modern navigation technology, and engage constructively with crews, not on those who simply follow checklists without comprehension.

Until OCIMF takes these issues seriously, SIRE 2.0 risks becoming a farce an expensive, digital charade masking outdated thinking behind tablets. This threatens not only vessel compliance but maritime safety itself.

OCIMF, the ocean doesn’t wait. Raise the bar on inspector competence, audit your guidance, and respect seafarers’ professionalism or step aside. Because nothing stops INTERTANKO, RIGHTSHIP, BIMCO, ICS, or even classification societies from building a system that actually works. In this industry, if you don’t improve, someone else will. And when that happens, the captain’s seat won’t be empty but OCIMF may find itself relegated to history, remembered not for leadership, but for losing its way.

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